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This chapter provides a conceptual basis for the price discovery poten-
tial for tradable market instruments and speciﬁcally the development of
mortgage securitization in Asia. We argue that securitization in Asia may
be potentially important because it may help bring transparency to the ﬁ-
nancial sector of Asian economies. We put forth a model explaining how
misaligned incentives can lead to bank-generated real estate crashes and
macroeconomic instability. We provide new comparative data on the bank-
ing sector’s performance in Asia compared to the performance of securi-
tized real estate returns, to provide evidence on the potential contribution
of misaligned incentives to the magnitude of the declines in the real estate
sector in the past. In particular, we show both theoretically and empirically
that the banking sector suﬀers relatively low losses following a negative de-
mand shock compared to the losses experienced by the real estate sector.
The evidence suggests that the fact that banks’ shares are publicly traded
does not discipline the bank lending oﬃcers who are driven by origination
fees and market share and does not prevent underpriced lending.
As a remedy to the inability of public ownership of banks to prevent un-
derpriced lending, we discuss how the addition of freely tradable and liq-
uid market instruments backed by loans (MBS) might help to inoculate
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a context of bank
funding of the real estate sector and its role in past real estate and ﬁnancial
crises. Section 3.3 presents a theoretical model of lending and development
activities that demonstrates how banks can provide underpriced ﬁnancing
and nonetheless avoid large losses following a negative demand shock. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents empirical results that indicate the impact of bank under-
priced lending on real estate markets is severely negative but that the banks
themselves are impacted to a far lesser extent. Section 3.5 interprets the
ﬁndings and concludes.
3.2 Context
Mera and Renaud (2000) demonstrate that the phrase “Asian ﬁnancial
crisis” was misleading. Green’s (2001) review of the book noted:1
[Asian Financial Crisis] suggests homogeneity: that “Asia” is one place,
and that the ﬁnancial crises faced by various countries there in the late
1990s were fundamentally similar. The fact that so many countries that
were geographically close faced crises that were temporally close makes
it easy to conclude that the crises had common roots. (216)
Ito (2007) also underscores how much Asian currency crises varied in the
late 1980s. Nevertheless, many Asian countries went through serious real
estate crises. In Japan, property values began falling in 1991 and continued
to do so until this year.2 Miller and Luangaram (1998) show that in Thai-
land and Indonesia, property values began falling in 1991, and in Thailand
fell dramatically in 1997. They also show how the market capitalization of
publicly traded companies specializing in real estate fell by 48 percent in
Indonesia between the second quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter of
1997 and by 88 percent in Thailand.
While property values were falling in these countries, banks actually in-
creased their lending share to property companies (Miller and Luangaram
1998) so that a bad situation got worse. Even though values were falling
and vacancies were rising, banks continued to roll over loans to property
owners until they reached the point where the property owners could no
longer service their debt service. According to Renaud (2001), vacancy
rates in Bangkok peaked at more than 40 percent.3Renaud (2001) and Fis-
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1. Much of the discussion of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in the following closely follows
Green (2001).
2. There has been much reporting on this. See, for example, “Around the Markets: Prop-
erty Investors Look Overseas for Value,” International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2007. http://
www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/21/business/sxasia.php.
3. See http://www.cushwakeasia.com/data/Bangkok/bacom0106.pdf.cher (2001) tell vivid stories about how poorly executed underwriting and
conﬂicts of interest made the real estate crises in these countries worse than
they needed to be.
It is worth spending a little time talking about the large real estate crises
in Thailand and Indonesia as well as the ability of Korea to avoid a crisis
of similar magnitude. Green (2001) summarizes Renaud and Fisher as fol-
lows:
Lenders assume rent and property value growth at some extremely high
rates, which in turn produces very low capitalization rates. This in turn
causes appraisers to assign high values to properties. These high values
provide the support lenders need to advance loans, which typically have
higher loan-to-value ratios. The high-loan-to-value ratios are justiﬁed
by the fact that property values “always” rise, and that therefore the eq-
uity in the loan will quickly get suﬃciently large to discourage default.
At the same time, the ﬁnancial institutions had reason to believe that
governments (or NGOs) would prevent them from failing, meaning that
the downside risk to the risky loans was attenuated. This led to a classic
moral hazard problem, where risk was not appropriately priced.
The problem with this, of course, is that sometimes values and rents
stop rising.
Thailand did seem able to put its problems behind it fairly quickly. Re-
naud (2000) points to an agency Thailand created to behave as the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC) did in response to the United States savings
and loan crisis. Like the RTC, the Financial Restructuring Agency (FRA)
seized the assets of failed ﬁnancial institutions and sold properties at sub-
stantial discounts to replacement cost. While we are not in a position to
know whether the FRA executed sales as well as possible, it did seem to re-
store liquidity to the market in Thailand, and Thailand returned from cri-
sis to growth fairly quickly.
We can return to the United States savings and loan crisis to gain some
historical perspective. The ignition of inﬂation in the late 1960s and 1970s
altered the ability of depositories to fund long-term, ﬁxed-rate mortgages
(FRMs): inﬂation pushed up nominal interest rates and required higher 
returns on deposits, while asset returns were ﬁxed at the low levels of his-
torical ﬁxed rates on long-term mortgages, which made up most of the
thrift industry portfolios. Inadequately capitalized depository institutions
(S&Ls) then advanced unsustainable commercial mortgages. Because
these institutions often had no equity to protect, their managers had large
incentives to make high-risk loans. If the loans failed, the institutions and
their depositors were no worse oﬀ.4 If they paid oﬀ, however, the institu-
tion would return to solvency. Because S&Ls were not required to mark
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4. Depositors have the beneﬁt of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC) Deposit Insurance.their assets to market, they were able to hide their distress until loans be-
gan defaulting. This points to the general issue, which we will return to, of
the signaling power of price discovery in capital markets.
By the late 1980s, poor real estate underwriting produced overbuilding
in the U.S. commercial real estate market. This led to high vacancies (ac-
cording to the U.S. Census, typical Class A Oﬃce Vacancy Rates in 1991
were in excess of 20 percent5) and declining rents. Buildings generated in-
suﬃcient cash ﬂow to meet debt services, and default rates rose dramati-
cally. The poor quality of assets on savings and loan balance sheets could
no longer be hidden.
Congress and the Bush administration bit the bullet by passing the Fed-
eral Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989; this leg-
islation liquidated insolvent savings and loans and turned their assets over
to the RTC, whose function was the disposition of the assets; cash raised
from the sales were used to oﬀset the costs of the S&L failure to U.S. tax-
payers. At the same time, thrift portfolios were restructured by exchanging
below market mortgages for MBS that could be sold and the losses amor-
tized rather than realized immediately. Thrifts solved their asset liability
mismatch by selling FRMs into the secondary market for securitization by
MBS underwritten by one of the U.S. secondary market agencies.
Thompson (2006) has a good description of what happened next:
Wall Street surveyed the mountain of defaulted S&L loans taken over by
the federal Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and saw an opportu-
nity to get into real estate investing in a big way. Morgan Stanley’s expe-
rience is typical of other investment banks at the time. “We got into the
investing side of the business primarily because the opportunity was
there to buy nonperforming loan portfolios from the RTC,” recalls
Slaughter. From a merchant banking standpoint, Wall Street barely paid
attention to commercial real estate prior to 1990. Since then, almost
every major Wall Street ﬁrm has become active in real estate private eq-
uity. “Morgan Stanley alone has gone from zero dollars under manage-
ment to almost $40 billion over the past ﬁfteen years,” says Slaughter.
Wall Street helped the RTC solve another big problem: how to dispose
of billions in S&L loans that were not in default. The agency came to
Wall Street with a proposal to sell loan packages rather than one prop-
erty at a time, an impractical approach given the volume of loans on the
RTC books. Wall Street responded by creating commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), which are similar to, but more complex than,
the mortgage-backed securities long used to bundle and sell packages of
residential loans. “Commercial mortgage-backed securities did not ex-
ist in 1990 and were not thought to be viable,” says Slaughter. Today,
CMBS represent a $550 billion market.
It’s hard to overestimate the impact of this market restructuring. In ﬁf-
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5. See http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/1228_oﬃce_buildings_vacancy_rates_for
_major.html.teen years, the public equity and debt markets for commercial real estate
have gone from ﬁnancial infancy to trillion-dollar status.
At the same time thrifts restructured their portfolios by exchanging
ﬁxed-rate mortgages for MBS to be sold to U.S. secondary market agen-
cies. The government encouraged this through allowing the losses to be
amortized rather than realized immediately (Wachter 1990). Thrifts then
solved their asset liability mismatch going forward by holding in their port-
folios newly available adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). For a time in the
U.S. it appeared that the short-term ARM would become common in the
United States. But inﬂation under control by the early 1990s, relatively ﬂat
yield curves, secondary market agency (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae) guarantees, and the liquidity derived from large standardized
market trading of MBS resulted in competitive FRM pricing in the U.S.
Elsewhere, in the absence of secondary market institutions, ARMs re-
mained far more common (Green and Wachter 2005). While banks solve
their asset liability mismatch problem by oﬀering ARMs, these convey
larger credit risks in the long run should economic shocks cause higher in-
terest rates.
The question remains, however, why the banking sector, in the United
States and elsewhere, drove itself into near bankruptcy with severe conse-
quences for the economy. This may be because the banking sector lacks in-
centives to curtail or even monitor risky lending activities. In particular, if
there is either deposit insurance, or if depositors assume certain institu-
tions are too big to fail, moral hazard becomes a serious problem, unless
there is adequate supervision (see Pavlov and Wachter 2006). Basel II and
many commentators are newly looking to market-based monitoring of
banks (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006) to ensure soundness and ﬁnancial
stability. This requires a reliance on market forces, and the threat of lost
fees and proﬁts, to align bank managers’ incentives to market outcomes. In
the following sections, we present a theoretical model and empirical evi-
dence of bank lending and development activities that demonstrate how
banks can provide underpriced ﬁnancing and nonetheless avoid the ap-
pearance of large losses even following a negative demand shock that is, in
part, induced by the banks’ own behavior.
3.3 A Model of Lender and Developer Behavior
In this section, we propose a simple one-period model with zero-proﬁt,
rational developers who bid on land prices in period 1 and supply devel-
oped real estate in period 2. These developers face an upward sloping
supply of land function in period 1, and a downward sloping real estate de-
mand function in period 2. The developers know the parameters of the de-
mand functions and choose the optimal level of development in period 1.
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demand function in period 2 (see ﬁgure 3.1). We assume it can take one of
three values high (H), low (L), and disaster (D):
with probability  H,  L, and  D, respectively.
There are two types of developers, safe and risky, who are identical in all
respects except that the safe developers default only in the disaster state, D,
while the risky developers (strategically choose to) default in states L as
well as D.
Lenders can correctly identify the type of developer (for example, higher
loan to value borrower) and price the zero-equity loans appropriately.6 (In
a later section, we also discuss the case in which lenders cannot distinguish
between the two types of developers.) We show in the following that if all
loans are priced correctly, then lenders have zero expected proﬁts, and the
lending activity has no impact on the underlying real estate market devel-
opment or pricing.
While our model is couched in terms of developers obtaining loans from
lenders directly, the more realistic interpretation is that individual home-
owners obtain the loans and commit to purchase properties from the devel-
opers. Developers are then incentivized to develop and meet the demand for
presales, and individual homeowners are interested in purchasing because
they can obtain loans from the lenders. Therefore, this chapter can be in-
terpreted in its entirety as a residential real estate paper.
To gain market share (and to book more short-term fees), lenders can en-
gage in underpricing by lending to some of the risky borrowers at the safe
rate. If that occurs, risky borrowers take advantage of the cheap ﬁnancing,
bid up land prices in period 1 above their prior levels, and overdevelop. As
a result, prices are lower in period 2 in all states, lenders have negative ex-
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6. The zero equity assumption is purely mechanical and can easily be replaced with any
other ﬁxed required LTV ratio. As will become apparent in the following, higher equity re-
quirement does not change our results, as long as the equity is not suﬃcient to absorb all neg-
ative demand shocks.
Fig. 3.1 Real estate demand function
Note:cdenotes the intercept of the real estate demand function in period 2. This intercept can
take one of three values, cH, cL, or cD.pected proﬁts, safe borrowers also have negative expected proﬁts, and risky
borrowers have zero expected proﬁts.
We further model the proﬁts of the lenders and their ability to hide small
losses due to the overall randomness of the lender’s activities in sectors
other than real estate. If this is the case, lenders do extend some under-
priced loans to risky borrowers, with all of the negative consequences this
generates. Importantly, reported proportional bank losses are smaller in
case of outcome (D) than the losses to real estate investors. The compen-
sation of bank managers is rationally maximized.
3.3.1 Safe Developers and Rational Lenders
In period zero, developers will build given the following supplyfunction:
(1) q   ,
where P denotes the price of land for development in period 1, q denotes
the quantity of land that is developed for period 2 and is determined in pe-
riod 1, and a and b are constants specifying the supply function.
In period 1 the price of the asset is given by the following demand func-
tion:
(2) Ps   cs   dq,
where cs denotes the intercept of the demand function for each state of na-
ture (S   H, L, or D), Ps denotes the price of developed land in period 2 in
each state of nature, and d is a constant specifying the slope of the demand
function.
Good borrowers default only in the case of disaster (D). The price they
are willing to pay is given by:
(3) RP   ,
where R denotes 1   interest rate charged on the safe loans. Solve for q:
(4) q  
The zero-proﬁt for a risk-neutral bank is:
(5) ( H    L)(R   1)P    d(P   PD).
Solve for q:
(6) q  
Equate q in expressions (4) and (6) to solve for R, substitute into equa-
tions (4) or (6) to ﬁnd the equilibrium quantity of real estate developed, q∗:
(a   cD) D   a(R   1)( H    L)
    
(d   bR)( H    L)
(cH   aR) H   (cL   aR) L    
(d   bR)( H    L)
 HPH    LPL   
 H    L
P   a
 
b
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where c  denotes the expected intercept of the demand function in period 2.
This is exactly the quantity real estate developed one would ﬁnd in the ab-
sence of lending, where full equity investors take on all gains and losses, 
P    HPH    LPL    DPD. Substitute q∗ into equations (1) and (2) to ﬁnd
the equilibrium current and future price:
(8) P∗   a   b
and
(9) Ps ∗   cs   d
Investor expected proﬁts are zero:
(10)   RP   0
3.3.2 Risky Developers and Rational Lenders
Risky developers default even in moderate losses, that is, in the case of
state (L) in period 2. The price they are willing to pay is given by:
(11) RBP   PH.
The lender’s zero-proﬁt condition is:
(12)  H(RB   1)P    L(PL   P)    D(P D   P).
Solve for equilibrium quantity of real estate developed following the
method of equations (3) to (7):
(13) q∗  
This solution is identical to the optimal development quantity under no
lending. Therefore, if properly priced, lending to risky borrowers does not
in itself aﬀect the real estate markets. In this situation, the bank takes all
losses, and charges an appropriate interest rate. Therefore, for ease of ex-
position, in what follows, we assume the bank lends only at the safe rate.
Otherwise, the bank can directly invest in real estate and not go through
risky investors.
3.3.3 Risky Developers and Underpricing Lenders
Assume in this section that the lender makes a certain proportion, h, of
the loans to risky borrowers at the safe rate. (In the following, we explicitly
c    a
 
b   d
 HPH    LPL   
 H    L
c    a
 
b   d
c    a
 
b   d
c    a
 
b   d
cH H   cL L   cD D   a
   
b   d
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velopers would ﬁnd the ability to borrow at the safe rate very attractive, the
quantity real estate developed then becomes:
(14) q∗
u   (1   h)q∗,
where q∗
udenotes the quantity developed in the underpricing case. The cur-
rent price of real estate increases, as given by equation (1), and the future
price of real estate in each of the three outcomes declines, as given by equa-
tion (2). Importantly, this new lower price of real estate aﬀects even safe in-
vestors and reduces their expected proﬁt:
(15)   0
Because current price, P, is higher under underpricing, and future price
in each state, Ps, is lower under underpricing for all s, real estate markets
decline more in economies that underprice. Speciﬁcally, following an out-
comes L or D, the percent price decline in real estate is:
(16) 1    1  
1    1   ,
which is increasing in h because a   E(cs). (Intercept of the supply func-
tion is far smaller than the intercept of the demand function.)
3.3.4 Lender Behavior
The bank can underprice by lending to the risky borrowers at the safe
rate, R. Let k denote the percent of real estate loans relative to the total
lending activity of the bank. Let hdenote the percent of real estate loans to
risky borrowers. Because the default rates on loans in other industries in
which the bank participates is noisy, the bank is able to hide losses of g or
less in the real estate sector. For instance, g can be two standard deviations
above the average loss on the bank portfolio.
While hiding losses is unlikely to persist over the long term, it can and
does happen between market crashes. Most markets accommodate this by
providing higher returns to investors during normal markets and larger
losses during substantial market downturns. Thus, investors receive a fare
rate of return, and the hiding during up markets can persist. The added
problem in real estate is that during the normal (up) markets additional de-
velopment occurs, and this additional development magniﬁes the eﬀects of
negative demand shocks.
Even in the absence of a negative demand shock, small losses accumu-
late over time and eventually get discovered. This would lead to both in-
cD(b   d)   d[E(cs)   a](1   h)
    
a(b   d)   b[E(cs)   a](1   h)
PD  
P
cL(b   d)   d[E(cs)   a](1   h)
    
a(b   d)   b[E(cs)   a](1   h)
PL  
P
∂[( HPH    LPL)/( H   L)   RP]
    
∂h
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ing standards, reduce the availability of credit, and add to moderately weak
economic fundamentals to produce a negative demand shock. That’s why
even in the absence of a signiﬁcant economic downturn, real estate markets
tend to experience substantial negative demand shocks on a regular basis.
If the bank lends only to safe borrowers, bank proﬁts on real estate
loans,  , are given by:
(17)     .
If the bank lends to risky borrowers and safe borrowers at the safe rate,
bank proﬁts on real estate loans are given by:
(18)    
.
We assume management compensation, M, is proportional to the loans
originated:
(19) M   (1   h)Pkm,
where m denotes the origination fees the management of the bank receives
as a compensation.
Therefore, managers maximize compensation by setting h:
(20) (P   PL)hk   g
or
(21) h   ,
which is an increasing function in g. For g   0, h   0, that is, if the bank
cannot hide any losses, the optimal amount of loans to the risky borrowers
is zero.
Following a D outcome, the reported unexpected bank losses on real es-
tate loans, as a proportion of originated loans, are:
(22)   1    .
which is smaller than the losses to real estate investment, 1 –PD/P. There-
fore, the reported proportional losses to the banking sector are smaller
than the proportional losses to the real estate sector. If the bank cannot
hide any losses, then g   0, h   0, and the proportional bank losses are the
same as real estate losses. Under loan securitization with liquid standard-
g
 
(1   h)P
PD  
P
(P   PD)(1   h)   g
   
(1   h)P
k[cL   E(cS)]    4kg[E(  cs)   a  ]   k2[  E(cs)     cL]2  
      
2k[E(cs)   a]
if H or L
if L
if D
(1   h)rP
(PL   P)h
(PD   P)(1   h)
if H or L
if D
rP
PD   P
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the banking sectors are protected.
Note that the general outcome of price inﬂation shown in the preceding
can be obtained in an equivalent model in which lenders cannot distinguish
between safe and risky borrowers or can distinguish at a cost. In that case,
a proportion of the loans will be made to risky borrowers. The only diﬀer-
ence in this alternative model is that the proportion of loans made to risky
borrowers is not an outcome of maximizing management compensation
but is an exogenous variable measuring the degree to which risky borrow-
ers can borrow at the safe rate. This implicitly assumes the lenders not only
cannot distinguish between safe and risky borrowers but also do not know
the proportion of loans they make to risky borrowers. If this is not the case,
and the lender cannot distinguish between risky and safe borrowers, then
the impact on asset markets is further magniﬁed. Mathematically, this is
equivalent to setting h 1 in our model, that is, the bank can hide losses of
any amount. Of course, no bank can hide losses beyond a certain magni-
tude. This is a purely mechanical adjustment to the model that demon-
strates the implications of the bank not being able to distinguish between
the safe and risky borrowers.
Finally, liquid standardized securitized real estate-backed debt can be
modeled by setting k in equation (19) to 1. In other words, securitized
mortgage debt is like a lender whose sole operations are in a speciﬁc real
estate market and property type. While liquid, standardized securitized
debt investors are not more or less sophisticated than bank shareholders,
because of the far more direct, uniform, and transparent link between the
underlying cash ﬂows and the investor payoﬀs, lenders are able to hide only
far smaller losses in this model. In other words, due to the uniformity and
mechanical nature of such securitized debt, even small losses get discov-
ered quickly, and overdevelopment is stopped before it occurs.
3.4 Data Description and Empirical Results
The ﬁrst data set we utilize is the Global Property Research (GPR) in-
dexes compiled by Eichholtz et al. (1998) and reﬁned and extended by Dr.
Christopher Shun, Menang Corporation, Malaysia.7 These data include
property indexes for twenty-ﬁve countries over twenty and twelve years for
developed and emerging countries, respectively. The GPR 250 Global
Property Stocks index only includes property companies with a minimum
of US$50 million of freely available market value and high liquidity in
terms of average last-year stock trading volume. As of December 2002, the
securities included in the GPR 250 index had a combined available market
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7. For further information, see the bibliographies for Eichholtz et al. (1998) and Shun
(2005).value of US$194 billion. This data set has a number of advantages. In par-
ticular, it has the deepest history and the largest cross-sectional span across
the globe of any real estate property database. Because the returns are
based on publicly traded and liquid securities, the data quality is high,
available at a monthly frequency, and consistent through time.
The second data set we use is the ﬁnancial return data from the Global
Financial Database (GBF); these data are compiled for 120 industries in
more than 200 countries. The GBF has a collection of more than 200,000
entries and oﬀers accurate and veriﬁed historical world market ﬁnancial
data. The ﬁnancial return data refers to the return of the ﬁnancial sector
within each market and is provided as monthly data.
We also make use of correlation results that are derived from previous
work in Pavlov and Wachter (2007). Pavlov and Wachter (2007) develop a
symptom of loan underpricing in an economy. This symptom is the nega-
tive relationship between the change in lending spread and asset returns
before the crash. We use the property returns data to measure the total
price decline during the crash for each market as indicated in the preced-
ing, and we calculate the correlation of the lending spread with this return
to identify economies that experience lending induced real estate crashes.
The lending spread for each market is calculated by the lending rate minus
the deposit rate. These data are collected from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI) Web site (http://www.worldbank.org/data).
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the GPR data used. We iden-
tify twelve countries that have experienced a market decline of 20 percent
or more during any period in the past. Such a large market decline corre-
sponds to our “Disaster” outcome described in the preceding theoretical
model. While market declines are a continuum, and the 20 percent cut-oﬀ
is somewhat arbitrary, our empirical data really provide two types of de-
clines—small in the order of 2 to 5 percent and large, well in excess of 20
percent. Therefore, our results are not tied to this cut-oﬀ point.
Using both the GPR and GBF databases, for each country, we compute
the correlation between changes in the lending spread and asset returns be-
fore the market decline. This is our underpricing symptom. Figure 3.2 is
replicated from Pavlov and Wachter (2007, ﬁg. 1). The vertical axis depicts
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Real estate  Financial 
Correlation % decline decline
Mean –0.19 –0.60 –0.16
Standard error 0.14 0.06 0.13
Median –0.15 –0.62 –0.20
Standard deviation 0.48 0.20 0.44the total percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom. This
is over one or more years and is speciﬁc for each country. According to
Pavlov and Wachter (2007), negative correlation between price changes
and changes in the lending spread is a symptom of underpricing, and, thus,
we expect this negative correlation to be associated with larger losses dur-
ing a market downturn, as it is. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom
of underpricing have zero or positive correlation, and their respective
property market declines are relatively modest, as the results indicate. We
replicate this ﬁgure because it illustrates that loan underpricing can have
devastating eﬀect on the underlying real estate markets.
To test the theoretical implication of our preceding model, that the
banking sector experiences smaller proportional declines than the real es-
tate sector, we plot the same underpricing symptom against the total de-
cline, top to bottom, of the ﬁnancial services sector in the same twelve
countries in ﬁgure 3.3. While the relationship is as expected, that is, lenders
in countries that underprice experience larger losses following a real estate
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Fig. 3.2 Real estate return
Notes: The correlation is computed between the total index return, including dividends, and
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this ﬁgure, we compute the correla-
tion using data before the crash, that is, from the beginning of our data set to the peak of the
property market. The vertical axis depicts the real estate return. This is over one or more years
and is speciﬁc for each country. According to our theory, negative correlation is a symptom
of underpricing and is associated with larger losses during a market downturn. Countries that
do not exhibit the symptom of underpricing have zero or positive correlation, and their re-
spective property market declines are relatively modest.negative demand shock, it is not statistically signiﬁcant and very modest
economically. This suggests that while underpricing hurts the ﬁnancial sec-
tor following a negative demand shock, the magnitude of this eﬀect is mod-
est relative to the real estate sector declines.
Finally, ﬁgure 3.4 reports the relationship between real estate returns
and ﬁnancial-sector returns. While the relationship is positive and signiﬁ-
cant, that is, markets that experience large real estate losses also experience
signiﬁcant banking losses, very clearly the ﬁnancial-services sector losses
are far more modest. Furthermore, while we only have a few data points, it
appears that real estate returns need to fall by 60 percent or more before
the ﬁnancial-services sector starts to experience signiﬁcant losses.
There are four countries that experienced real estate market crashes but
very limited banking losses or even substantially positive returns: Hong
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Fig. 3.3 Financial-sector return
Notes: The correlation is computed between the total real estate index return, including div-
idends, and the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. The vertical axis depicts
the ﬁnancial-sector total return over the period of the real estate market crash. This is over
one or more years and is speciﬁc for each country. According to our theory, negative correla-
tion is a symptom of underpricing and is associated with larger losses in real estate markets
during a market downturn. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of underpricing have
zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are relatively mod-
est. This ﬁgure shows that the ﬁnancial-sector returns are also negatively impacted by under-
pricing but by a far more modest extent than real estate returns. The relationship is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and of smaller magnitude.Kong, New Zealand, Belgium, and Norway. First, while substantial, the
real estate crashes in these countries represent the lowest four real estate
market declines in our data set. Second, each one of these countries had a
particularly strong banking sector that did not appear to engage in under-
pricing and fared the real estate losses quite well.
Hong Kong used particularly strong underwriting standards, with very
low LTV ratios and close scrutiny of loan applications. New Zealand and
Belgium have always had very stable and closely monitored banking sys-
tems, and while default losses did increase during the real estate market
crashes in the two countries, these increases were modest and well man-
aged. Finally, the Norwegian ﬁnancial system, while exposed to real estate,
was also stable and fared relatively well during the real estate downturn 
for two reasons. First, the Norwegian banking system experienced a major
crisis during the 1988 to 1993 period, which had a cleansing eﬀect on its
loan underwriting mechanisms. Second, during the period of the Norwe-
gian real estate market decline, 1997 to 2001, oil prices increased from
about $16 to over $30 per gallon, which helped the entire Norwegian ﬁ-
nancial system.
Misaligned Incentives and Mortgage Lending in Asia 109
Fig. 3.4 Financial and real returns
Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the total real estate returns versus the total ﬁnancial-sector returns
following the real estate market crash. Real estate returns and ﬁnancial-sector returns are
positively correlated. However, ﬁnancial-sector losses are generally more modest than real es-
tate losses. Furthermore, the ﬁnancial sector does not seem to experience any signiﬁcant
losses until real estate losses reach 60 percent or more.In summary, even though the data provide for only a limited number of
observations, the ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical model. First,
the banking sector of countries with strong ﬁnancial systems and solid,
consistent underwriting standards fare real estate market crashes well. On
the other hand, countries that are likely to engage in risky, underpriced
lending tend to experience larger real estate market declines, which are
translated into ﬁnancial-sector declines. Nonetheless, these ﬁnancial de-
clines are relatively modest, even though banks are highly levered.
3.5 Conclusions and Implications for Alternate Financial Structures
In previous work, we have demonstrated the role that bank lending plays
in generating boom and bust cycles in real estate. Rational economic be-
havior dictates that banks charge borrowers higher interest rates, origina-
tion fees, or mortgage insurance for their imbedded put option to default.
While the presence of demand deposit insurance undermines market dis-
cipline, where are the shareholders? Why can’t they monitor lending oﬃ-
cials’ behavior?
In this chapter, we develop a model to explain why underpricing of risk
is not detected or curtailed by bank shareholders. As a result, underpricing
persists undeterred and results in compression in the spread between lend-
ing and deposit rates, lending booms, inﬂated asset prices, excess building,
and real estate crashes.
The link between bank lending and real estate crashes is enabled by the
absence of short selling in real estate, which allows optimistic investors to
drive prices up (Carey 1990; and Herring and Wachter 2003). But this is an
insuﬃcient explanation for sustained underpricing episodes because opti-
mists still need ﬁnancing to buy real estate if they are not to be constrained
by their own limited assets, which will eventually go to zero due to their
misjudgments. This optimist-led pricing is enabled and heightened by
banks that supply funds to the optimists at rates that underprice risk. The
model that we put forth here is based on the very nature of banks, their di-
versiﬁcation that makes the identiﬁcation of the signals of the underpric-
ing of risk diﬃcult except with considerable delay.
Such underpricing behavior forces a race to the bottom across lending
institutions, with marketwide consequences. The longer the underlying
real estate cycle, the greater the value of the put option, the inelasticity of
the supply of real estate, and the elasticity of demand for bank loans, the
greater the probability that the market will enter into an equilibrium in
which all banks underprice risk with marketwide consequences that will be
discovered (Pavlov and Wachter 2006). Even then with forbearance of reg-
ulatory authorities and the intervention of governments, banks may be
bailed out, mitigating the consequences for shareholders. Nonetheless, the
110 Richard Green, Roberto S. Mariano, Andrey Pavlov, and Susan Wachterfundamental factor that explains why episodes of bank underpricing of
risk are likely to occur is the inability of banking shareholders to identify
these episodes promptly and incentivize correct pricing.
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